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ROMAN CHYTILEK1 
The newly published book of Northern Irish political scientist and activist, Peter 
Emerson, From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics. Electing a Power-Sharing 
Coalition is a very personal and passionate defence of consensual voting 
procedures. I liked reading the preface, where the author nicely and very honestly 
discussed his relationship to what he was going to discuss, along with clearly 
declaring his normative position to the subject. 
So what is Emerson for? He is for maximum power-sharing, all-party coalitions 
for executives and proportional representation in legislatures. Entrusting 
legislatures with maximal power, he devises special voting procedure based on 
preferential voting, the matrix vote, to elect the executive during one ballot with 
multiple issues (and options) being voted simultaneously. In case of the executive, 
individual executive portfolios, preferably even that of the prime minister, are 
allocated in that way. Emerson contrasts his proposals with the current trend of 
majoritarianism, in which binary yes-no, win-lose elections are typical, and 
a subsequent number of decisions are left to the single figure of prime minister, 
whom he calls an “elected dictator”. He is also not satisfied with the current uses 
of decision rules based on proportional representation, in which he regards the 
forming of the executives to be very slow. Emerson advocates uses of non-binary 
options for the referendums as well. His subtle argument that especially when the 
status quo option is the winner of the binary referendum ballot, the “status quo” is 
only rarely left unchanged in the form in which it was voted on, is inspiring and 
begs to be a subject of further empirical research. The book is also full of examples 
explaining the mechanics of electoral rules that Emerson advocates with such 
ubiquitous passion. 
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To start with some substantive critique, it seems to me that the book should 
provide much better theoretical analysis of ballots with multiple issues (doesn’t 
matter whether with binary and/or non-binary options) which seem to be the 
central democratic innovation proposed by Emerson. The problem with them is 
that the voters have nonseparable preferences about the issues and the set of 
decisions which is achieved as a result of the simultaneous ballot may be even 
Condorcet loser and/or Pareto-dominated by any other combination of outcomes 
(Lacy and Niou 2000). Lacy and Niou show that it is only an optical illusion that 
multiple simultaneous ballots (with or without multiple options voted for) lead to 
socially more desirable outcomes. They also show that in legislatures (as contrasted 
to general electorates) the problem of nonseparable preferences can be well 
resolved through sequential voting and vote trading. This is in my eyes a very 
serious argument in favour of sequential, instead of simultaneous, voting when 
dealing with multiple issues. Otherwise we are running a serious risk of arriving 
through efficient, representative and consensual procedure to the result which is 
not consensual at all. Yet the book is silent about it. 
Unfortunately the book doesn’t generally fare too well when it comes to 
acquainting the reader with the previous research in the field. The lament about the 
perils of majoritarianism with the spiral of division, long-term antagonism, violence 
and the increasing dead toll in divided societies isn’t new, yet references to the work 
of Reynolds, Reilly, Sisk, Boogards and others – and much more importantly, to 
their substantive arguments – are missing. Wasn’t it for this omission of potentially 
relevant information, the author would be able to make more empirically rich 
arguments for his cause without the need to stick with the iterative mantra of 
“millions people dead as a result of majoritarianism” argument. Moreover, the level 
of empirical detail in the book is clearly insufficient for such a very strong 
conclusion. True, there are tens of illustrative examples of shortcomings of 
majoritarianism which is judged by its worst examples by Emerson. On the 
contrary, he is much more relaxed to his own proposals, bringing forth their best 
intensions in the hypothetic examples of how to use them. His line of reasoning is 
that while politicians abuse majoritarian rules, they value the consensual ones and 
use them to achieve socially desirable results. Personally I find the indications of 
the hypothetical “pre-decision” of the author that consensual rules exclude the 
attempt to abuse them to be quite unrealistic.  
A little less systematic than usual inquiry of the author also led me to some 
doubts about possible confusion between correlation and causation at some points 
of his argumentation. He is right that proportional systems, for example, are not 
the fastest ones in terms of government formation; however the problem may not 
always be related to portfolios but, for instance, to policy formulation. Emerson’s 
way of creating an executive is time-efficient in terms of office-seeking logic, but 
can have quite ambivalent consequences from the point of view of the subsequent 
steadfastness of the chosen government and policy considerations. The book also 
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posed a significant challenge for the author in terms of the generalisability of his 
suggestions. While in some parts it is relatively strictly placed as a remedy for 
conflict and divided societies, in other contexts it suggests conviction about their 
universal suitability. 
To conclude, although the book probably does not exhibit the usual level of 
theoretical depth and rigorousness typical for comparative research on electoral 
systems, one has to agree with the foreword of Ian McLean that it offers viable 
alternative to the winner-take-all logic of that kind where the democracy can still 
thrive. For me, the reading was primarily about thinking about contexts where it is 
actually better to use non-binary voting. In the department of thought provoking 
ideas is Peter Emerson clearly a pertinent choice! 
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